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Article 2

INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS AND
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE
When the United States was predominately agricultural
and its processes of government fairly simple, it could be
said with some accuracy that the legislature made the laws,
the executive enforced them, and the judiciary construed
and applied them. As the national economy became industrialized, however, governmental activity was forced into
new fields, and traditional institutions became inadequate.
The legislators lacked the ability and the time to deal with
the new problems. The judges were faced with situations
requiring specialized knowledge which few of their number
possessed. Accordingly, as new needs developed, executive
boards or commissions composed of experts were established
with powers to formulate "laws," apprehend violators, determine mooted facts, construe the "law," and render decisions affecting the rights and duties of the parties. Thousands of such tribunals sprung up, ranging from municipal
boards of zoning appeals to the great federal administrative
commissions.1
1 "Effects of the Growth of Administrative Law upon Traditional AngloAmerican Legal Theories and Practices," C. G. Haines, 26 Ai. PoL. Sci. Rv.'875
(October, 1932); "Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power," R. A.
Brown, 19 MwNn. L. Rv.261 (February, 193S); "The Task of Administrative
Law," 75 UNiv. oF PENN. L. REv. 614 (May, 1927); "Non-Judicial Administration
of Law, J. B. Smith, 12 UNIv. oF Cnv. L. Rv.459 (November, 1938). The President's Committee on Administrative Management, in its report, pointed out the following facts which have vitally influenced the evolution of regulatory commissions:
"First, the decline of laissez-faire and the growth of governmental regulation of
business that followed upon the heels of the Civil War and Reconstruction. Second,
the emergence of vitally important economic. problems demanding Federal rather
than State regulation. Third, the growth of the technique of governmental regulation
through the legislative formulation of 'standards' of business conduct to be applied
in concrete cases by the quasi-judicial decisions of administrative agencies. Fourth,
the emergence of the idea that governmental regulation of business should not be
confined to the enforcement of criminal penalties but should partake of continuous
and not unfriendly supervision. Early congressional experimentation with the independent commission was influenced by the experience of the States. Twenty-five
State commissions were already regulating railroads when the Interstate Commerce
Act was passed in 1887. The seeds were being rapidly sown for the growth of the
multitude of State boards and commissions that were ultimately to produce the
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These tribunals mock the separation of powers dogma at
every point. It is exceedingly difficult to place them in any
one of the three departments, for they appear to exercise
functions which are both legislative and judicial as well as
executive in character. This serious constitutional question
cannot be solved through the medium of definition or
through the process of analytical differentiation. When
judges are faced with the contention that an administrative
commission is really performing legislative and judicial functions, they maintain that, though such functions may be
"quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial," they are not legislative and judicial in the constitutional sense. The Federal Trade Commission furnishes an interesting
illustration of this commingling of functions in administrative
tribunals. The functions performed by the Commission are
partly administrative in nature, but predominately quasilegislative and quasi-judicial. In administering the provisions of the statute concerning "unfair methods of competition" the Commission acts quasi-legislatively when it
fills in the meaning of the general standard set forth in the
act and quasi-judicially when it institutes proceedings, conducts hearings, and issues orders to "cease and desist." When
it conducts an investigation at the direction of the President, it serves in a legislative capacity, providing him with
information on which to base his recommendations to Congress. In making investigations and reports for the information of Congress it functions as a legislative agency. The
Commission serves as an agent of the judiciary when it acts
as a master in chancery under rules prescribed by the court
in anti-trust cases. Indeed it exercises administrative powalmost complete decentralization of executive power in the American State." REPORT OF THE COMMITEE (1937), p. 209.
2 "The Constitutional Status of the Independent Regulatory Commissions,"
R. E. Cushman, 24 CORNELL L. Q. 13, 16 (December, 1938); "Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power," R. A. Brown, 19 MINN. L. REv. 261, 265-66
(February, 1935); Ex parte Lewis, 328 Mo. 843, 42 S. W. (2d) 21 (1931); In re
Freeholders of Hudson County, 105 N. J. L. 57, 142 A. 536 (1928); Suckow v.
Alderson, 182 Cal. 247, 187 P. 965 (1920).
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ers only to the extent that such is necessary in the discharge
and effectuation of its quasi-legiilative and quasi-judicial
powers or of its duties as an agency of the legislative *or
judicial departments of the government.3
The use of the prefix "quasi" is intended to avoid the
separation of powers objection. It is argued that, while
legislative powers may not be delegated by the legislatures,
there are no prohibitions against the delegation of quasilegislative powers. Likewise, while judicial powers may not
be granted to any agency but the courts, there is nothing to
limit the grant of powers of a quasi-judicial nature. The
term "quasi" means "almost, but not quite." Thus, although legislative and judicial powers may not be vested in
executive agencies, powers which are "almost" legislative
and "almost" judicial may be constitutionally conferred.
Such labels -

artificial and indefinite though they seem -

constitute the important criterion of legality applied by the
courts which are called upon to determine whether delegated
powers are legislative and judicial or quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial.4 Court decisions indicate that a matter is
quasi-legislative and delegable where the legislature has set
forth a general policy or standard for the guidance of the
body to which the delegation is made. In the case of judicial
delegations, where the administrative determination is to be
merely advisory and without effect until approved by a regu3 Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 55 S. Ct. 869, 79 L.
Ed. 1611 (1935); "Development of Jurisdiction and Powers of the Federal Trade
Commission," M. Bronaugh, 30 LAw NoTEs 125 (1926). See Brinkley v. Hassig,
83 Fed. (2d) 351 (1936).
4 "The Constitutional Status of the Independent Regulatory Commissions,"
R. E. Cushman, 24 CORNEL L. Q. 13, 28-29 (December, 1938); "The Legal Status
of a Board of Zoning Appeals," G. A. Warp, 27 Ky. L. J. 185 (January, 1939);
"Wage-Fixing by Administrative Agehcies-Legislative or Judicial?" G. P..O'Grady,
27 GEORG TowN L. J. 486 (February, 1939). "The distinction between a judicial
and a legislative act is well defined. The one determines what the law is, and what
the rights of the parties are, with reference to transactions already had; the other
prescribes what the law shall be in future cases arising under it." Union Pacific R.
Co. v. United States, 99 U. S. 700, 761, 25 L. Ed. 496 (1878). The fallacy underlying the rule dgainst delegation is stated in " 'Government,' 'Law,' and the Separation of Powers," K. C. Cole, 33 Am. POL. Sci. R v. 424 (June, 1939).
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lar judicial tribunal, the courts usually find no difficulty in
holding that the functions conferred are quasi-judicial in
nature.
The legislature is frequently in such a position that it cannot itself practically or efficiently perform the duties of determining the rights, duties, and liabilities of persons and
corporations under certain factual conditions. Obviously, it
cannot remain in session and pass a new act upon every
change of conditions, but, since the power to enact a law includes the right to adopt a procedure for its administration,
it may designate some tribunal to perform the duties necessary to carry out its legislative purposes. The fact that the
law creates commissions or boards with power to administer
it does not render it invalid as delegating legislative power
though it invests such agencies with the exercise of discretion in the performance of their duties. It is impractical for
the law itself to prescribe every detail of the duties to be
performed by the boards and commissions charged with its
administration. While the power to determine the policy
of the law is primarily legislative and cannot be delegated,
the power to make rules of a subordinate character in order
to carry out that policy and apply it to varying conditions
is in its dominant aspect administrative and may be delegated. When the legislature has indicated its will by the
enactment of a law, power to determine the facts upon which
the operation of the statute depends may be conferred on a
commission. 6 The law is thus made by the legislature, and
5 Chas. Uhden, Inc. v. Greenough, 181 Wash. 412, 43 P. (2d) 983, 98 A. L. R.
1181 (1935); Hubbell v. Higgins, 148 Iowa 36, 126 N. W. 914, Ann. Cas. 1912B,
822 (190); State v. Thompson, 160 Mo. 333, 60 S. W. 1077 (1901); Texas National Guard Armory Board v. McGraw, 132 Tex. 613, 126 S. W. (2d) 627 (1939);

Reif v. Barrett, 355 111. 104, 188 S. E. 889 (1933) ; Associated Industries oj Oklahoma v. Industrial Welfare Commission, 185 Okla. 177, 90 P. (2d) 899 (1939);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241, 79 L. Ed. 446 (1935);
State ex rel. Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 220 N. W.
929 (1928); "The Delegation of Legislative Functions," J. B. Cheadle, 27 YALE
L. J. 892 (May, 1918); "Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power,"
R. A. Brown, 19 MLNN. L. REV. 261 (February, 1935).

6 Miller v. Schuster, 227 Iowa 1005, 289 N. W. 702 (1940), noted in 25 IoWA

L. REV. 812 (May, 1940); Chambers v. McCollum, 47 Ida. 74, 272 P. 707 (1928);
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the facts upon which its operation is dependent are ascertained by the administrative board.
Under these court-made rules state boards and commissions have been empowered to prescribe regulations governing health,7 welfare, 8 police,9 education, 0 civil service," public works,' 2 drainage and irrigation. 3 In many cases the
scope of such regulations is broad. If the powers granted
to commissions are too broad, however, the statutes conferring them may be invalid. The standard must be reasonably
clear and must constitute a check on the administrative body

applying it. While it may be vague in its terms, it cannot
be broad and meaningless. 4 When Congress, under the National Industrial Recovery Act, tried to grant the President
unlimited power to enact laws which he might deem beneficial in meeting the conditions confronting commercial and
industrial interests, the United States Supreme Court'"
Brown v. Univ. of the State of New York, 242 App. Div. 85, 273 N. Y. S. 809
(1934); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 31 S. Ct. 480, 55 L. Ed. 563
(1911).
7 Polinsky v. People, 73 N. Y. 65 (1878); City of New Orleans v. Sanford,
137 La. 628, 69 S. 35 (1915); Zucht v. King, 260 U. S. 174, 43 S. Ct. 24, 67 L. Ed.
194 (1922); Board of Health of Covington v. Kollman, 156 Ky. 351, 160 S. W.
1052, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 354 (1913).
8 Fox v. Mohawk & Hudson River Humane Society, 165 N. Y. 517, 59 N. E.
353, 51 L. R. A. 681, 80 Am. St. Rep. 767 (1901).
9 Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375, 19 N.E. 224 (1889); State Racing
Commission v. Latonia Agricultural Assn., 136 Ky. 173, 123 S. W. 681, 25 L. R. A.
.(N. S.) 905 (1909).
10 Posey v. Board of Education of Buncombe County, 199 N. C. 306, 154 S. E.
393, 70 A. L. R. 1306 (1930).
11 People 5x rel. Akin v. Kipley, 171 Ill. 44, 49 N. E. 229, 41 L. R. A. 775
(1890); Walker v. Towle, 156 Ind. 639, 59 N. E. 20, 53 L. R. A. 749 (1901).
12 State cx r. West Virginia Traction Co. v. Board of Public Works of City
of Camden, 56 N. J. L. 431, 29 A. 163 (1894).
I3 Myles Salt Co., Ltd. v. Board of Commissioners of the Iberia & St. Mary
DrainageDistrict, 239 U. S. 478, 36 S. Ct. 204, 60 L. Ed. 392 (1916).
14 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 280
N. Y. 194, 20 N. E. (2d) 390, 394 (1939); Smithberger v. Banning, 129 Neb. 651,
262 N. W. 492, 100 A. L. R. 686 (1935); People v. Klinck Packing-Co., 214 N. Y.
121, 108 N. E. 278, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 1051 (1915).
15 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 S. Ct.
837, 79 L. Ed. 1570, 97 A. L. R. 947 (1935). The reasoning of the Schechter case
on the question of delegation of legislative power was followed in the Ohio case
of Divisional Code Authority No. 23, Retail Solid Fuel Industry v. Reisenberg,
129 Ohio St. 679, 196 N. E. 424 (1935).
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ruled the attempted delegation unconstitutional. In his
concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Cardozo termed the Act
"delegation running riot.'
He said that "There can be
no grant to the executive of any roving commission to inquire into evils and, upon discovering them, to do anything
he pleases to correct them."' 7 The same remarks would
have been applicable had the delegation been to a board.
Thus, a statute attempting to confer unlimited.power on a
state railroad commission to authorize an increase in the
capital stock of railroad corporations for such purposes as
it may deem desirable is unconstitutional.'" For the same
reason, the policy "to maintain a balance between agricultural producers and consumers, to restore normal economic
conditions, and to eliminate unfair practices" will not warrant a carte blanche transfer of authority to an administrative agency over the control generally of vegetable produce. 9
Similarly, the legislature may not delegate to a board the
power to declare what acts shall constitute a criminal offense.2 ' But the legislature may go far. Thus, the Interstate Commerce Commission, in addition to its rate-making
powers, may be authorized by Congress to conduct investigations and be given power to summon witnesses, obtain
records, etc. 2 The Commission may determine the order
of purposes for which coal may be shipped in interstate
commerce in case of emergency,2 2 prescribe a uniform system
16
A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U, S. 495, 553, 55
S. Ct. 837, 79 L. Ed. 1570, 97 A. L. R. 947 (1935).
17 Ibid., 551 quoting from his dissenting opinion in Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 435, 55 S. Ct. 241, 79 L. Ed. 446 (1935).
Is State v. Great Northern Ry. Co, 100 Minn. 445, 111 N. W. 289, 10 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 250 (1907).
19 Chas. Uhden, Inc. v. Greenough, 181 Wash. 412, 43 P. (2d) 983, 98 A. L.
R. 1181 (1935).
20 State v. Anklam, 43 Ariz. 362, 31 P. (2d) 888 (1934); People v. Hanrahan,
75 Mich. 611, 42 N. W. 1124, 4 L. R. A. 751 (1889); Sutherland v. Miller, 79
W. Va. 796, 91 S. E. 993, L. R. A. 1917D, 1040 (1917); 65 A. L. R. 525, 527.
However, the legislature may empower a board to prescribe duties on which the
law may operate in imposing a penalty and in realizing the purpose of the law.
32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 639.
21 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 14 S. Ct.
1125, 38 L. Ed. 1047 (1894).
22 Avent v. United States, 266 U. S. 127, 45 S. Ct. 34, 69 L. Ed. 202 (1924).
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of accounting and bookkeeping for carriers, 23 and fix requirements for drawbars of uniform height under the safety appliance laws.2"
Not only do administrative tribunals exercise legislative
powers but they exercise powers so obviously of a judicial
nature that it has been suggested by some that they be
termed "administrative courts" 2' and by others that their
judicial functions be divorced from them and exercised by a
separate body.2" In the course of their administration of
laws these commissions are empowered to determine questions of fact and apply the existing law. Their conclusions
may be given such probity that courts may not overturn
them except on clear and convincing proof that they are
Indeed, many boards are created whose deerroneous.2
cisions of fact honestly made within their jurisdiction are
23 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194,
32 S. Ct. 436, 56 L. Ed. 729 (1912).
24 St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281,
28 S. Ct. 616, 52 L. Ed. 1061 (1908).
25 Plunkitt v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 77, 70 S. E. 781 (1911).
26 The President's Committee on Administrative Management recommended
that the work of each commission be split, its judicial duties going to a "judicial
section" and its administrative duties going to an "administrative section." "The
Judicial Section should be set up on an independent basis in the executive department, and its name might well contain the word 'judicial' or 'court,' in order
In the matter of size no
to draw attention to the judicial nature of its work ....
arbitrary rule can be laid down, but the section should be kept as small as possible
and still do its" work effectively. Excessive size retards judicial deliberation, but a
body that must handle a complex job will need more members than one that does
not. The existing commissions range in size from three to eleven. Probably most
Judicial Sections could manage with five members. A body doing only quasijudicial work could be smaller than one burdened with rule-making and administrative duties.... The terms of office should be 12 to 14 years and appointments
should be staggered to assure continuity of policy and experience. Everything
should be done to encourage the reappointment of competent members. Removals
from office should be made only for incompetence and misconduct. Salaries should
be adequate. . . . The Administrative Section should have a bureau or division
status . . . (with) a responsible head, replacing the board or commission form of
organization. . . . Every effort should be made to set up the Administrative Sections on a career basis. . . . The relations between Administrative and Judicial
Sections would, in actual practice, have to develop by trial and error." REPORT oF
THE CoMIT= (1937), pp. 232-34. The argument against taking away judicial
functions from such boards is presented in "Separation of Functions and the National Labor Relations Board," H. W. Davey, 7 UNrV. or C~ic. L. Rtv. 328
(February, 1940).
27 "Administrative Finality," A. M. Tollefson, 29 MIcH. L. REv. 839 (May,
1931).
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not subject to review in any proceeding. 8 One court has
gone so far as to indicate that the findings of the commissions may be made as final as the action of the legislature
in enacting a statute.2 9 Of course, the decision of such a
board may be made conclusive only when the board is acting within its jurisdiction. Consequently, the question of
jurisdiction is always open to the courts for review. The
commission cannot itself conclusively settle that question
and thus endow itself with power.3" Even though no appeal
from its conclusions be provided, when a commission has
clearly violated the law in arriving at its result,3 ' it has committed jurisdictional error. Its action may be reversed by
the courts just as effectively as when it has failed to take
proper steps to acquire jurisdiction at the beginning of the
proceeding.3 2
It is axiomatic that courts of justice, in their popular sense,
may not be set up and established in the executive department, for they pertain exclusively to the judicial branch. If
the duty to be exercised is primarily to decide questions of
legal right between private parties, the function clearly belongs to the judiciary. When an executive board has regulatory functions, however, it may hear and determine controversies which are incidental to those functions. 33 Thus,
a fish and game commission may hold hearings and determine facts incidental to regulation of fish and game. 34 A
state compensation commission may determine questions of
28 State ex rel. Crabb v. Olinger, 196 Wash. 308, 82 P. (2d) 865 (1938).
29

Commonwealth v. Sisson, 189 Mass. 247, 75 N. E. 619, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.)

752, 109 Am. St. Rep. 630 (1905).

See "Finality of Administrative Findings of

Fact Since Crowell v. Benson," 24 VA. L. REv. 653 (April, 1938).

30 State ex rel. Williams v. Whitman, 116 Fla. 196, 156 S. 705, 95 A. L. R.
1416 (1934).
31 For example, when it makes a decision contrary to all the evidence.
32 However, the proceedings before commissions are not expected to be as
"formal and cumbrous" as court proceedings. The greater flexibility which such
bodies must possess demands greater freedom of action. Borgnis v. Falk, 147 Wis.
327, 133 N. W. 209 (1911).
33 In re Opinion of the Justices, 87 N. H. 492, 179 A. 344 (1935).
34 Globe Cotton Oil Mills v. Zellerbach, 200 Cal. 276, 252 P. 1038 (1927).
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fact and apply the state law thereto." A statute providing
for sexual sterilization of certain patients of state institutions afflicted with recurrent hereditary insanity and resting
discretionary powers on the state board of public affairs does
not violate the separation of powers doctrine. 6 Such administrative bodies have been held not to be judicial bodies
and not to exercise judicial functions, yet their procedure is
judicial and they use processes similar to those used in courts
of law.
There seems to be little question but that administrative
tribunals seriously infringe the judicial function of the
courts. The gist of the judicial power is to decide. Where
that ultimate decision, as a practical matter, rests with an
administrative tribunal, to that extent the judicial power has
been affected. If the courts merely furnish the enforcement
process for the administrative determination, the essence
of the judicatory function is with the boards and not with
the courts."
Likewise, judicial review of only a small part
of the commissibn's determination leaves that body as the
sole and final arbiter of the part of the controversy to
which the review does not extend. Anyone familiar with
workmen's compensation litigation knows that in nearly all
of the cases it is the commission's determination of facts
that is the conclusive and decisive factor. Even where
judicial review is permitted, the administrative decision may
be the final word. One who tells the poor fisherman whose
nets have been destroyed by a game warden that this destruction has not affected his rights is guilty of contemptuous
irony. While the fisherman has the liberty of an action
against the officer for damages, 8 he must spend time and
35 Oren v. Swift & Co., 330 Mo. 869, 51 S. W. (2d) 59 (1932). It is immaterial that a de notio hearing be denied on review. Wheeling Corrugating Co.

v. McManigal, 41 Fed. (2d) 593 (1930).
36 In re Main, 162 Okla. 65, 19 P. (2d) 153 (1933).
37 "Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power," R. A. Brown, 19
AIMN_.L. REv. 261, 274 (February, 1935). See also the Illinois case of Borreson
v. Department of Public Welfare, 368 Ill. 425, 14 N. E. (2d) 485 (1938).
38 Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 14 S. Ct. 499, 38 L. Ed. 385 (1893).
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money far beyond his ability to command if he follows such
a course.3 1 In the last analysis it would seem that the only
limits on the granting of judicial powers to administrative
commissions is that the power of enforcement be left with
the courts and that a modicum of judicial review be available.4"
In brief, the separation of powers dogma has not been invoked to obstruct the delegation to administrative tribunals
of substantial legislative and judicial functions.4 ' While it
is true that most governmental agencies are located wholly
within the boundary lines of a single department, the doctrine of separation of powers does not necessarily require
such allocation. It would seem wise to recognize frankly
the convenience and necessity of having governmental
agencies which are not in one department to the exclusion
of the others -- agencies which straddle several departments
while forming essential parts of each.4 2
39 "Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power," R. A. Brown, 19
MINx. L. REV. 261, 274-75 (February, 1935).
40
Ibid., 304; "Approach to the Extent of Judicial Supervision over Administrative Agencies," H. P. Warner, 28 GEORGETOWN L. J. 1042 (May, 1940); "To
What Extent Should the Decisions of Administrative Bodies Be Reviewable by the
Courts?" C. B. Stephens, 25 AM. BAR ASSN. J. 543 (July, 1939)"; "'Government,'
'Law,' and the Separation of Powers," K. C. Cole, 33 Am. POL. Sci. Rav. 424
(June, 1939); "Administrative Policies and the Courts," J. M. Landis, 47 YALE
L. J. 519 (February, 1938); "Judicial Review of Administrative Action in West
Virginia," K. C. Davis, 44 W. VA. L. Q. 270 (June, 1938).
41 "The Constitutional Status of the Independent Regulatory Commissions,"
R. E. Cushman, 24 CoRNr L. Q. 13, 40 (December, 1938).
42 "Administrative . . . tribunals did not come because anyone wanted them
to come. They came because there seemed to be no other practical way of carrying
on the affairs of government and discharging the duties and obligations which an
increasingly complex social organization made it necessary for the government to
perform. . . ." "Administrative Law and the Constitution," M. B. Rosenberry, 23
Am. POL. Sc. REv. 32, 35 (February, 1929). "These boards have been created in
response to a public demand for increased efficiency in government and to meet
social needs. . . . Their procedure is uniformly characterized by inexpensiveness,
swifter and less complicated modes of trial, and by authority to assert an initiative
in the condut of a case. . . -" "Administrative Tribunals," W. H. Pillsbury, 36
HAv. L. REv. 405, 407 (February, 1923). But administrative tribunals have been
vigorously criticized. The President's Committee on Administrative Management
found that "the independent regulatory commissions constitute a serious and increasing problem. They exist as areas of complete irresponsibility within which important policy-determining and administrative functions are being carried on. ...
They hinder coordination of policy and coordination of administration. At the
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The problem of just how far the legislature may go in
clothing an administrative tribunal with a garb resembling
legislative and judicial power is one of the most intriguing
in American public laiw. While courts have not been very
consistent in dealing with it, the main tendency appears to
be toward a considerable intermingling of powers.43 The
views of Mr. Justice Holmes in the Springer Case"' would
seem to represent the present position of the courts. Dissenting from the other members of the Supreme Court, he
said:
"The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide
fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to
terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the
other.... When we come to the fundamental distinctions it is still more
obvious that they must be received with a certain latitude or our government could not go on... . It is said that the powers of Congress cannot be delegated, yet Congress has established the Interstate Commerce
Commission, which does legislative, judicial and executive acts, only
softened by a quasi.... It does not seem to need argument to show that
however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry
out the distinction between legislative and executive action with math-

ematical precision and divide the branches into watertight compartments ....-"45

George Warp.
Charlottesville, Virginia.

same time, the policy-determining aspects of the regulatory job are interwoven
with judicial and quasi-judicial duties. The functions of prosecutor and judge are
placed in the same hands, and the impartiality so necessary to the proper handling
of judicial work is imperiled by the pressures, both subjective and objective, which
tend to influence the commissions on matters of policy. Thus the problem is not
an accidental or superficial one; it arises from the inherent nature of the commissions and their work. It will remain as long as the commissions are kept; it
will increase in seriousness as they are multiplied." REPORT OF TEE COmmITTEE
(1937), p. 239.
43 "American Administrative Law in 1931," M. E. Dimock, 26 AM. PoL. Sci.
REv. 894, 896 (October, 1932).
44 Springer v. Government of the PhilippineIslands, 277 U. S. 189, 48 S.Ct.
480, 72 L. Ed. 845 (1928).
45 Ibid., 209-11.

